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IMTBOPgCTIQIi
Symbolic expression is an important and common part of 
America? it ranges from marches to burning flags in the street. 
The act becomes the unspoken word by conveying a message. One 
burns a flag in public not because he is a pyromaniac; one 
chooses to do so because the act delivers his message much more 
effectively than his words alone could ever do. When there is 
this element of speech, symbolic expression falls under the 
protection of the First Amendment to the United States Constitu­
tion, which reads:
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment 
of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof? 
or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press? or 
the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to 
petition the government for a redress of grievances.1
The issue at hand will deal directly with "freedom of speech" and
"the right . . .  to assemble," and indirectly with "the right . .
. to petition the government." These rights are fundamental and
have a special status against infringement, but since one's right
to speak is not absolute, an act is even more removed from being
an unconditional right. This is the point of inquiry: what forms
of expression are or are not permissible? why are these acts
committed? and why are some acts allowed, while some are not?
Before freedom of symbolic expression can be thoroughly 
examined, it must be clearly defined. Basically, it is an act 
performed to convey a message. This inquiry will deal specific­
ally with forms of political protests in the United States,
including, but certainly not limited to, those actions opposing 
the Vietnam War and discrimination against blacks* One important 
form of symbolic expression that will be left out is the labor 
picket. This is because it is more economical than political, 
and thus would bring into the argument a plethora of business 
legislation; since this would draw the analysis away from the 
main argument, it must be excluded. Therefore, this analysis 
deals only with actions which convey a political view to the 
government and the world, not to one's employer. Furthermore, 
the act which contains an element of speech must not be confused 
with actual speech itself; this is especially important with 
cases like Street v. New York, where Justice Harlan avoids 
dealing with the question of whether burning the American flag is 
constitutionally protected speech by basing his ruling solely on 
Street's spoken words against the flag.2
THEORETICAL FRAME BBM
To understand what freedom of symbolic expression means 
today, it is important to know its origins. This is because the 
past serves as a foundation for the present to build on. This is 
analogous to the way one would add on and remodel one's own home; 
one makes the necessary improvements as time requires, rather 
than tear it down and rebuild it. The origin is commonly cited 
as the First Amendment to the United States Constitution, but 
what it meant at the time it was drafted, and what that meaning 
evolved into by the twentieth century is of equcimportance.
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Since the framers of the Constitution and the Bill of Rights 
were intelligent and educated men, it is reasonable to assume 
they were influenced not only by public opinion, but also by the 
theories and historic lessons present at that time. One of the 
earliest lessons in freedom of expression was Athen's execution 
of Socrates for corrupting the youth of the city; this injustice 
was a major factor that led Plato, a student of Socrates, to 
reject democracy, calling it a flawed system of government. 
However, men of the modern era felt that democracy was the way to 
preserve liberty. Milton, in his famous speech to Parliament, in 
1644, delivered what has been "widely regarded as the first 
comprehensive analysis of the arguments underlying free expres­
sion.”3 He said that "[w]here there is much desire to learn, 
there of necessity will be much arguing, much writing, many 
opinions? for opinion in good men is but knowledge in the mak­
ing."4 Later, in 1688, freedom of speech in Parliament and 
religion were granted in England? in 1694, England abolished 
censorship. During this period, Hobbes "originated the modern 
doctrine of natural rights,"5 labeling the right to refuse to 
incriminate oneself as one of them.6 Back in the colonies, 
English law prevailed, but Hobbes' ideas were not forgotten.
When Zenger was charged with seditious libel, his defense attor­
ney, Alexander Hamilton, made a claim to "natural rights":
It is a right which all freemen claim? to complain when 
they are hurt. They have a right publically to 
remonstrate against the abuses of power in the 
strongest terms.7
Zenger was found not guilty? this was another victory for freedom
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of expression. These events were by no means a comprehensive 
development of freedom of expression before the American Revolu­
tion/ but merely serve as examples of what an intelligent man 
would have been aware of at the time.
The various documents and rhetoric of the late eighteenth 
century show that freedom of expression meant more than a few 
words in the First Amendment of the United States Constitution.
In the Declaration of Independence, Jefferson stated that men 
were “endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable Rights, 
that among them are Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of Happi­
ness.”8 Despite the fact that this was such a general state­
ment, Jefferson made it quite clear that this new nation would be 
devoted to preserving individual liberties. The federalist 
papers represent some of the thoughts of hew to protect freedom 
of expression. Hamilton, in federalist 84, said that the “bles­
sings of liberty” clause in the constitution would be sufficient 
for protecting people’s rights? he said that a bill of rights 
could not encompass everything and would imply that everything 
not listed is not a right.9 Madison, in federalist 10, spoke of 
freedom of expression in terms of allowing political parties-- 
known as factions at the time— to exist and make their ideas 
known? he also said that if their ideas “may convulse the societ- 
y,“ the ballot box was the solution.10 However, Madison con­
fessed in a letter to Jefferson— dated October 17, 1788--that he 
had “always been in favor of a bill of rights.”11
Pollack, a constitutional scholar, observed that “[rjatific-
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ation of the (constitution] was, politically speaking, contingent 
on a virtual commitment by Madison and his associates to propose 
liberalising amendments to the first Congress.1,11 Thus, on 
June 8, 1789, Madison presented his proposed amendments to the 
constitution, but they were far from being original ideas at the 
time; the states already had bills of rights or other guarantees 
of liberties. Massachusetts* constitution included the right to 
assemble and petition the government, and it noted that the 
**liberty of the press is essential to the security of freedom in 
a State.*'13 In fact, of the fourteen states at the time the 
Bill of Rights was ratified, the protections of the right to 
express oneself were as follows: two states guaranteed freedom of 
speech; four protected freedom of speech in the legislature; four 
had freedom of assembly; five had the right to petition the gov­
ernment; six protected people from self-incrimination; eight 
guaranteed freedom of the press; and thirteen had freedom of 
religion. This list shows that the right to remain silent, to 
write one's views, and to "talk" to God in the manner one wished 
to do so were the most important ones at the time. The Bill of 
Rights guaranteed these and other rights at the national level; 
not only did these states ratify the amendments, but as a group—  
at least with respect to freedom of expression— they endorsed and 
protected the liberties in their own constitutions. As far as 
the common people were concerned, they not only supported the 
idea of having a bill of rights, they feared not having a list of 
guaranteed freedoms. One widely published article, in 1787,
6
accused the government of wanting "The Liberty of the Press 
abolished . • • And death if we dare complain.>,u People feared 
that a strong national government would be unresponsive to the 
needs of the individu. 1; the Bill of Rights put the necessary 
limits on governmental control.
The first significant limit on freedom of expression was the 
Alien and Sedition Acts. A response to the French threat and the 
Jeffersonians, it became a crime to "write, print, utter or 
publish • . . any false, scandalous and malicious writing" 
against any member of the government of the United States.15 
This met serious opposition from the Republican Party, as Jeffer­
son and Mauison declared the acts invalid via the Kentucky and 
Virginia resolutions. However, neither the Sedition Acts nor the 
states1 attempt to declare a federal law invalid were put to the 
test at this time; these constitutional questions were to be 
reserved for another time. Freedom of expression, as a specific 
issue, would not enter the Supreme Court's agenda until the 
twentieth century.
Nevertheless, some events relevant to freedom of expression 
transpired in the nineteenth century. Thomas Jefferson said in 
his 1801 inaugural address that it was important for men "to 
think freely and to speak and write what they think."16 In 
Msgallsgh y» Maryi anti, Chief Justice John Marshall told the 
nation that the Constitution is not a code, stipulating that the 
Court "must never forget it is a constitution [it is] expound­
ing."17 This later became important to understanding why First
Amendment guarantees were not absolute. In 1859, John Stuart
Mill published his famous essay, "On Liberty.M He supported
freedom of speech with vigor when he wrote:
The opinion which [the government]it is attempted to 
suppress by authority may possibly be true. Those who 
desire to suppress it, of course deny its truth; but 
they are not infallible. They have no authority to 
decide the question for all mankind, and exclude every 
other person from the means of judging.18
As wise as this statement may have been, it was not original in
content. It was when he synthesized this with a statement that
looked like a precursor to Holmes1 "clear and present danger"
doctrine that Mill's genius arose:
No one pretends that actions should be as free as 
opinions. On the contrary, even opinions lose 
immunity, when the circumstances in which they are 
expressed are such as to constitute their expression a 
positive instigation to some mischievous act.19
Mill did not exert much influence over the men of his time, but
his impact became apparent years later, as his ideas showed up in
various forms. A few years later, the Civil War stifled freedom
of speech, but the issue was more focused on the writ of habeas
corpus than the First Amendment. Finally, events such as the
Haymarket bomb in 1886 marked "the turning-point away from
toleration for extremists."20 Mill, the Civil War, and events
like the Haymarket bomb were especially important as they had
both an emotional and intellectual impact on the Supreme Court
Justices of the early twentieth century, since many of them lived
through these events.
Before an in-depth discussion is made on freedom of symbolic 
expression, it is important to understand why it exists. The
8
United States has a sense of responsibility of, as well as a deep 
attachment and respect for, the Constitution, Although it is not 
a code, its principles of justice, law, and liberty hold true in 
the hearts and minds of the people and the government. When this 
ideal is questioned, the Supreme Court is called upon to inter­
pret our beloved constitution. When the Supreme Court began 
deciding freedom of expression issues, beginning in the twentieth 
century, it did so with this respect for national stability and 
individual liberties. The result is neither oppression nor 
legalized anarchy? the First Amendment evolves, as its meaning 
takes shape and form.
BSTM U BHIfRIfT..91
The Court broke new ground on many freedom of speech cases, 
and created various tests and theories to deal with these new 
issues. This section concentrates on the major doctrines, some 
arising out of cases which did not involve symbolic expression, 
to provide the framework the Supreme Court works within when they 
do deal with symbolic speech. These tests become the Supreme 
Court’s guide to what freedom of symbolic expression means.
Application to the states
One of the most important doctrines was born when the 
Supreme Court, in Gitlow v. New York, said freedom of speech 
applies to the states via the due process clause of the Four­
teenth Amendment. Justice Sanford said that:
9
[f]or present purposes we may and do assume that 
freedom of speech and of the press . . . are among the 
fundamental personal rights and "liberties1' protected 
by the due process clause of the 14th Amendment from 
impairment by the states.21
The Supreme Court did not apply freedom of speech because it was 
in the Bill of Rights, but rather because they considered it to 
be "fundamental." Thomas Emerson, a professor of law, said this 
"point was briefly stated and passed almost unnoticed, but it 
turned out to be the most lasting and significant aspect of the
decision.1,22
Time, Place, And Manner
Earlier, in the Massachusetts Supreme Court, Holmes formu­
lated his doctrine of allowing time, place and manner regulations 
if they were content neutral. The case was Massachusetts v.
Davis (1895), and the future Supreme Court Justice wrote:
For the legislature absolutely or conditionally to 
forbid public speaking in a highway or public park is 
no more an infringement of the rights of a member of 
the public than for the owner of a private house to 
forbid it in his house.23
The significance of this case was that it established an equal 
access guideline that, despite modifications, was to be used by 
the Supreme Court.
Guaranteed Access View
In Hague v. CIO, the Court used the content neutral require­
ment when it established the right to public forum, also knows as 
the "guaranteed access view."24 The Supreme Court said that an
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ordinance that allowed a Director of Safety to deny permits,
based on his own discretion of danger, was invalid on its face.
Justice Roberts, writing for the court, said,
streets and parks . . . have been used for purposes of 
assembly, communicating thoughts between its citizens, 
and discussing public questions. [This] has, from 
ancient times, been a part of the privileges, 
immunities, rights, and liberties of citizens, . . . 
[which] must not, in the guise of regulation, be 
abridged or denied.25
This established the right to use "streets and parks" to express 
oneself, free from restrictions on the content of one's message.
Clear And Present Danger Doctrine
Holmes' "clear and present danger" doctrine had a more
restrictive view of freedom of expression. In 1919, in Schenck
V. United.States I Justice Holmes established that if the threat
becomes real and powerful, then speech loses its protection:
The question in every case is whether the words are 
used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as 
to create a clear and present danger that they will 
bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a 
right to prevent. It is a question of proximity and 
degree.26
In one of his most famous statements, he gave us an example of
this, by saying that freedom of speech "would not protect a man
in falsely shouting fire in a theatre and causing a panic."27
When Holmes explained where the "clear and present danger" may
lie, he limited the scope of the doctrine to wartime:
When a nation is at war many things that might be said 
in time of peace are of such a hinderance to its effort 
that their utterance will not be endured so long as men 
fight, and that no Court could regard them as protected 
by any constitutional right.28
Thus, creating a hinderance to war efforts appeared to be the 
true holding of the case; Emerson criticized that the Court,
**[wjithout specifically finding that the leaflet created such a 
clear and present danger, . . . concluded by affirming the 
convictions.1,29 Nevertheless, this case established the idea 
that freedom of speech could be restricted if it presented a 
"clear and present danger."
This doctrine was implicitly upheld in the Frohwerk and Debs 
cases,30 but it was Holmes' dissent in Abrams v. United States 
(1919), which Brandeis joined, that further defined the "clear 
and present danger" test. While the majority convicted Abrams 
for interfering with the war effort with Russia, Holmes said the 
war effort with Germany— which was the issue in Schenck. Froh­
werk. and Debs--was a much more serious problem:
I think we should be eternally vigilant against 
attempts to check the expression of opinions that we 
loathe and believe should be fraught with death, unless 
they so imminently threaten immediate interference with 
the lawful and pressing purposes of the law that an 
immediate check is required to save the country.31
Holmes was saying that the threat of Germany— in Schenck. 
Frohwerk. and Debs— was so immediate that it was necessary to re­
strict any speech that would hurt the war effort; in Abrams, the 
majority appeared to be building on Holmes' doctrine, but he 
pointed out that the situation with Russia did not make "it 
immediately dangerous to leave the correction of evil counsels to 
time."32 The test was redefined again in a concurring opinion 
by Brandeis, which Holmes joined, in Whitney v. California 
(1927). Brandeis agreed with the majority in that Whitney's
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conviction for violating a California Criminal Syndicalism Act
should be upheld; he disagreed with the Court's reasoning, which
was based on Whitney's collective action being a greater public
threat than a few isolated incidents and words.33 Brandeis saw
"clear and present danger" as controlling the case:
[A]lthough the rights of free speech and assembly are 
fundamental, they are not in their nature absolute. . . 
. In order to support a clear finding of clear and 
present danger it must be shown either that immediate 
serious violence was to be expected or was advocated, 
or that past conduct furnished reason to believe such 
advocacy was contemplated. . . . [N]o danger flowing 
from speech can be deemed clear and present, unless the 
incidence of the evil apprehended is so imminent that 
it may befall before there is opportunity for full 
discussion.34
Brandeis gave the doctrine meaning outside the context of war, 
clarified Gitlow's finding of freedom of speech's fundamentality 
under the Fourteenth Amendment, and provided a guideline for 
deciding cases under the test. Emerson noted that the group of 
cases just presented breaks the test down to: "clear" being the 
need for a "strong" proof; "present" being "imminent, not re­
mote"; and "danger" being an emotional elicitor.35 Thus, the 
test comes down to the causation of the restriction, imminence of 
the danger, and the seriousness of the danger.
Fighting Words Doctrine
Another test was the fighting words doctrine, established in 
1942, in Chaolinsky v. Hew Hampshire. Justice Murphy, writing 
for a unanimous Court, and citing Cantwell and Chafee, said that 
"fighting words" included:
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certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of 
speech, the prevention and punishment of which have 
never been thought to raise any constitutional problem, 
. . . those which by their very utterance inflict 
injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of peace.
• • . [S]uch utterances are no essential part of any 
exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social 
value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be 
derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social 
interest in order and morality.36
This test applies mostly when inflammatory speech is directed at
specific individuals, rather than a general statement. Emerson
criticized this test as a value judgement by the Court as to what
speech is of such "slight social value" to warrant restric-
tion.jr
Other Tests
Other tests include the balancing test and the incitement 
test. The balancing test merely asks if the government's inter­
est in preventing violence and turmoil outweighs freedom of 
expression in a particular case; the problem is that it is a 
vague test, or as Emerson puts it: "it supplies no satisfactory 
answer."38 The incitement test was developed in the Cantwell 
and Feiner cases, and allows suppression of expression if it may 
tend to incite one to violence or riot; this test is also vague, 
and Emerson criticized this as being "an arbitrary formula."39
P’BElfeO Test
Another, more modern, test is the three step-two track 
analysis, established in United States v. O'Brien (1968). First, 
the two track analysis is: (1) If the government interest is 
unrelated to a suppression of free expression, then the regula­
tion is put through Ha fairly serious balancing scrutiny"? and 
(2) If the government interest is related to the suppression of 
free expression, then the regulation is unconstitutional unless 
"it fells within a specifically and narrowly defined category of 
unprotected speech."40 The three step process is the balancing 
test of the first track, and it considers if: (1) the regulation 
"furthers an important or substantial governmental interest"? (2) 
the government's interest is not related to the suppression of 
free expression? and (3) the incidental restriction is no greater 
than that interest.41 This test was a conglomeration of several 
tests, including the fighting words doctrine in track two, and 
balancing tests in track one and the three step process.
CAM ANALYSIS.Qr rREEPQK..QZ .6^ XB.QLIC EXPRESSION
Although Congress and the state legislatures pass the laws 
that restrict freedom of expression, it has been the Supreme 
Court that had the final say on whether these laws could stand up 
to one's fundamental right to free expression. The Supreme 
Court's decisions in freedom of symbolic expression cases have 
been categorized as: freedom of assembly? the right to public 
forum? the right to wear clothing that makes a statement? and 
one's right to express oneself through disrespecting or destroy­
ing things, such as the United States flag and draft cards. The 
Court's job has been to decide how far these rights extend.
Freedom of Assembly
15
Freedom of assembly, listed in the First Amendment, has been 
vigorously protected by the Supreme Court. In 1937, DeJonge v. 
Oregon established freedom of assembly as a fundamental right 
that applies to the states via due process, as well as the right 
to hold a meeting. DeJonge was arrested and convicted for taking 
part in a public meeting held by the Communist Party. Chief 
Justice Hughes wrote for a unanimous Court, and distinguished 
this case from Gitlow and Whitney on the grounds that DeJonge*s 
conviction was merely for taking part in a public meeting.42 He 
then declared that "legislative intervention can find constitu­
tional justification only by dealing with the abuse. The rights 
themselves must not be curtailed.1,43 Hughes concluded that "the 
defendant still enjoyed his personal right of free speech and to 
take part in a peaceable assembly having a lawful purpose, al­
though called by that Party."44 Since the expression was unre­
lated to violence, it was protected by the First Amendment.
In Brandenburg v. Ohio (1969), the Court struck down an Ohio 
sedition law, while overruling Whitney v. California (1927). 
Brandenburg, the leader of the Ku Klux Klan, invited a reporter 
to film one of their rallies, which included hooded figures and 
racist statements, such as "[b]ury the niggers" and "[w]e intend 
to do our part."45 Portions of the rally were televised. This 
film, along other items, were used as evidence to eventually 
convict Brandenburg under an Ohio Syndicalism statute, which made 
criminal,
advocating . . . the [use] of crime, sabotage,
violence, or unlawful methods of terrorism as a means
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of accomplishing industrial or political reform . . . 
[and to] voluntarily assembl[e] with any society, 
group, or assemblage of persons formed to teach or 
advocate the doctrines of criminal syndicalism.46
Brandenburg challenged the validity of the statute under the
First and Fourteenth Amendments, but was nevertheless convicted.
The Supreme Court decided, Per Curiam, in favor of Brandenburg.
The Court said the statute in question was like the one used to
convict Whitney for "advocating violent means to effect political
and economic change." Using a case history analysis, Whitney was
overruled, and the Ohio statute was invalidated:
Whitney has been thoroughly discredited by later 
decisions, [which] fashioned the principle that the 
constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press 
do not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy 
of the use of force or law violation except where such 
advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent 
lawless action and is likely to produce such action.47
Here, the Court cited DeJonge and relied on an incitement test to 
invalidate the sedition law. Furthermore, it said that a "stat­
ute which fails to draw [the] distinction" between "teaching,"
and mobilizing a group to "violent action, . . . impermissably
%
intrudes upon the freedoms guaranteed by the FirSt and Fourteenth 
Amendments.1,48 Finally, the Court held that this statute did 
punish for "mere advocacy" ana thus, noting a similarity to 
DeJonoe and Hague, was a violation of the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments.49 While this was a freedom of assembly case with a 
conduct aspect, it was decided on the verbal expression.
Later, in Coates v. Cincinnati (1971), the Court struck down 
an ordinance that made it illegal for "three or more persons to 
assemble [on] any of the sidewalks [and] there conduct themselves
in a manner annoying to persons passing by.1*50 Justice Stewart,
writing for the Court, said:
[The ordinance is] vague because it subjects the exer­
cise of the right of assembly to an unascertainable 
standard, and unconstitutionally broad because it 
authorizes the punishment of constitutionally protected 
conduct.51
Here, the Court struck down the ordinance with the overbreadth 
doctrine, as Shapiro suggested, "on the grounds that it might be 
used to prosecute those whose speech simply annoyed their lis­
teners. ”5*
In deciding that Communists, Klansmen, and annoying people 
have a right to assemble and express themselves, the Supreme 
Court granted the right to belong in a group and advocate its 
policies, regardless of the fact that a majority of Americans may 
despise what they stand for. Tolerance was established in these 
three cases; the only surprising thing was that it took so long, 
for this nation was founded on allowing what Madison called 
"factions" to exist.
The right to public forum
The right to public forum is one's right to demonstrate one 
views in a particular place. This is subject to reasonable time, 
place, and manner restrictions by the legislature, usually in the 
form of statutory and permit reguirements. The Court has been 
very reluctant to support prior restraints and the suppression of 
the speech element of demonstrations, while it has been more 
willing to uphold statutes narrowly based on time, place, and
18
manner restrictions.
Public streets
The Supreme Court followed the "guaranteed access view,"
established in Hague v. CIO, as far as the public streets were
concerned. Basically, where one's right to demonstrate in the
street has been the only variable, the Court has been quite
willing to allow it. In Cantwell v. Connecticut (1940), the
Court held a Jehovah's witness had the right to advocate his
views, via a record player. Cantwell, played a record in the
street, which denounced all organized religions, and then singled
out the Catholic Church. When people let him know they were
offended, he left and walked up the street. Justice Roberts,
writing for the Court, said:
[The First Amendment] embraces two concepts--freedom to 
believe and freedom to act. The first is absolute but 
in the nature of things, the second cannot be. Conduct 
remains subject to regulation for the protection of 
society.53
Roberts meant that Cantwell had a right to believe in the reli­
gious views he advocated, but his right to disseminate those 
beliefs was not unlimited. Roberts examined the conduct aspect 
of the case with a combination of a balancing test, the incite­
ment test, the overbreadth test, and the clear and present danger 
test, with special attention to this last test. In doing this, 
he concluded that Cantwell committed "no assault or threatening 
of bodily harm, no truculent bearing, no intentional discourtesy, 
no personal abuse." All the Jehovah's witness did was try to
19
persuade people to buy his book or donate to his cause.54
This doctrine that the streets are open to the public was 
reinforced in 1965, in Cox v. Louisiana I; this involved only the 
first appeal, which dealt with the charges of disturbing the 
peace and obstructing public passageways. This case began in 
Baton Rouge, with the arrest of 23 students for picketing stores 
that had segregated lunch counters. Cox, a Field Secretary of 
CORE (Congress of Racial Equality), mobilized a group of students 
to a courthouse to protest the arrests, obeying the police's 
order to confine the demonstration across the street from the 
courthouse. As the white onlookers grew impatient, the police 
ordered the protestors to disperse, and when they refused, tear 
gas was used to force them away. The next day, Cox was arrested 
and charged with "criminal conspiracy, disturbing the peace, 
obstructing public passages, and picketing before a courthouse"; 
he was convicted of the last three charges.55 Justice Goldberg, 
writing for the Court, overturned the breach of peace conviction 
as a violation of Cox's rights of "free speech and free assemb­
ly."56 He explained that "constitutional rights may not be 
denied simply because of hostility to their assertion or exer­
cise," but based his final ruling on the fact that the breach of 
peace statute was "unconstitutionally vague" and a thus a viola­
tion of the First and Fourteenth Amendments.57
Justice Goldberg continued in true form by overturning Cox's 
"obstructing public passages conviction." He criticized the 
police's action:
20
It is clearly unconstitutional to enable a public 
official to determine which expressions of view will be 
permitted and which will not or to engage in invidious 
discrimination among persons or groups either by use of 
a statute providing a system of broad discretionary 
power or, as in this case, the equivalent of such a 
system by selective enforcement of an extremely broad 
prohibitory statute.58
The Court called this "unfettered discretion in local officials .
. . an unwarranted abridgment of appellant's freedom of speech 
and assembly secured to him by tne First Amendment as applied to 
the States by the Fourteenth Amendment."59 The fact that public 
forum has been granted in the past in Baton Rouge meant that it 
could not be denied arbitrarily. Emerson noted that this case 
rendered unconstitutional "most existing breach of peace, disor­
derly conduct, general sedition, and similar statutes."60
In another student demonstration case, teas.-Y.t Indiana
(1973), a conviction for intending to incite lawless action was
overturned by the Supreme Court. The scene was a demonstration
protesting the Vietnam War, in which over 100 demonstrators
blocked the street until the police moved them to the curb.
Hess, a member of this demonstration, responded to the police's
action by saying: "We'll take the fucking street later."61 He
was then arrested and later convicted for this. In a Per Curiam
decision, the Court said his words "amounted to nothing more than
advocacy of illegal action at some indefinite future time." The
Court, relying on Brandenburg, continued:
[S]ince there was no evidence, or rational inference 
from the import of the language, that his words were 
intended to produce and likely to produce, imminent 
disorder, those words could not be punished by the 
State on the ground that they had "a tendency to lead
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to violence.1,62
Thus, Hess was singled out for his words, or mere advocacy; the 
mobilizing of a group to violent action was not present, and the 
demonstration was irrelevant to the case. The case helped to 
establish that the streets were not completely available to the 
public; the state had an interest in keeping the streets open, 
but not in suppressing verbal objections to that interest.
That is basically the conclusion of all three of these 
cases— Cantwell. Qex, and H.gs_§, The sidewalks are public fora 
for anyone who wishes to advocate his cause; this rule is vio­
lated when the demonstration blocks traffic, which is what 
happens when people congregate in the street. Basically, the 
Supreme Court is willing to recognize that people can demonstrate 
but they cannot just go out and block traffic any time they 
please.
Permit requirements
Just when can people block the streets? The streets are 
obstructed every time there is a parade, and this is the very 
device people use to advocate their cause. One holds a parade, 
better known as obtaining a permit to march in the streets.
These permits are not permitted to suppress certain kinds of 
speech, whether if it is within the statute or if it leaves the 
decision to an official; the regulation must contain reasonable 
time, place, and manner restrictions. This is because prior 
restraints on "pure speech" are unconstitutional,63 while those 
on the act, known as "speech plus," are not always invalid.64
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Cox v. New Hampshire (1941) dealt with a group of Jehovah's 
witnesses convicted of parading without a permit, which could 
cost as much as $300. Chief Justice Hughes writing for the 
Court, upheld the conviction on the grounds that the permit 
requirement placed reasonable time, place, and manner restric­
tions on those who wished to obtain one:
The obvious advantage of requiring application for a 
permit was noted as giving the public authorities 
notice in advance so as to afford opportunity for 
proper policing. . . .  We find it impossible to say 
that the limited authority conferred by the licensing 
provisions of the statute . . . contravened any con­
stitutional right.65
Although the price of the permit was high, Hughes established 
that people could not just march through the streets any time 
they pleased, if a permit law was in effect. Emerson said this 
case established that "under some circumstances, the government
t
may demand a permit be secured in advance of engaging in assembly 
or petitioning, and that the permit may impose certain conditions 
upon the exercise of the right."66
A decade later, in Kunz v. New York (1951), a permit system 
was struck down for lack of appropriate standards of approval. A 
Hew York city statute prohibited public worship meetings in the 
street without first obtaining a permit; this statute also made 
it unlawful to advocate atheism, or to ridicule or denounce a 
religion. The police commissioner denied a permit to a religious 
leader who, in the past, has denounced Catholics and Jews, and 
has created disturbances. Justice Vinson, writing for the 
majority, struck down the statute as being too arbitrary, for,
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absent more concrete standards, it effectively gave the police 
commissioner power to control the expression of ideas,67 Emer­
son said this case established that although permit systems were 
acceptable, more concrete standards than "the possibility of 
•disorder or violence•1,68 were necessary.
The next two cases both involved a civil rights march, in 
Birmingham, in the late 1960*s. The first, Walter V* Birmingham 
(1967), upheld a conviction for violating an injunction. It 
began with Martin Luther King and others being denied a permit to 
march through the streets of Birmingham. The permit was denied 
by the City Commission, since a statute gave them the power to 
deny permits if giving one would threaten the "public welfare, 
peace, safety, health, decency, good order, or morals."69 The 
two organizations demonstrated anyway and were arrested; mean­
while, the city obtained an ex parte injunction enjoining them.
In spite of this, the groups protested again, and were held in 
contempt of court for disobeying an injunction; the Supreme Court 
of Alabama upheld their convictions, and the United States 
Supreme Court affirmed this decision. Justice Stewart, writing 
for the Court, quoted Howat v. Kansas;
An injunction . . • must be obeyed . . . however er­
roneous the action of the court may be, even if the 
error be in the assumption of the validity of a seeming 
but void law going to the merits of the case.70
The first part of this statement clearly stated that an injunc­
tion could not be violated, regardless o2 the circumstances; this 
was not only reasonable grounds to decide the case but was 
clearly a tactical move by the Court to preserve a part of the
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judiciary's power. Unfortunately, this was done at a time when
blacks felt that no governmental institution would help them, not
even the judiciary. However, Stewart, while dismissing the
defendants' argument, opened the door when he said what the Court
may have done had the facts would have been a little different:
[T]his case would arise in quite a different consti- 
tutional posture if the petitioners, before disobeying 
the injunction, had challenged it in the Alabama 
courts, and had been met with delay or frustration of 
their constitutional claims.71
Stewart was saying that the judicial system did not want symbolic 
gestures violating its procedures? if one feels justice has not 
been done, make an appeal.
A demonstrator in the same march eventually got the oppor­
tunity to take Stewart up on his challenge, and, in ShUttl«M.ttrth 
v. Birmingham (1969), the ordinance was held invalid by the 
Court. Justice Stewart wrote the opinion for this case also, 
and, citing Hague, reaffirmed the right to public forum:
[0]ur decisions have made clear that a person faced 
with such an unconstitutional licensing law may ignore 
it and engage with impunity in the exercise of the 
right of free expression for which the law purpotes to 
require a license.72
Thus, Stewart was true to his word in Walker: he upheld the right
to demonstrate one's views. Emerson described this pair of cases
as a political move by the Supreme Court:
The argument based on preserving an image of the judi­
cial process . • • saves the courts from paying for 
their own mistakes, but it also transfers the burden to 
others. In the long run no mystical respect for the 
courts is likely to persist on the basis of a rule of 
law that allows the court to punish an individual even 
when the court itself has been wrong.73
Walker, although it preserved the power of the courts at the
time, would have been detrimental to the judiciary’s credibility
without Shuttlesworth. On the other hand, Ledsky of the Ohio
State Law Journal saw uiese two cases in a more positive light:
Walker should be a warning to those tempted to flaunt 
the authority of the courts. . . . Shuttlesworth should 
likewise warn municipal officials who would abuse 
individual's rights that the court will protect such 
rights.74
The cases involving permits— Cox. Kunz. Walker, and Shut­
tlesworth— establish the notion that public forum must be granted 
unless the government deems it absolutely necessary to deny it. 
When it does deny a permit, reasonable guidelines are needed. If 
a public official has a great deal of discretionary power in 
granting permits, the Court will be very critical and highly 
unlikely to uphold the statute granting him such power. Ledsky 
said that "[t]o provide the licensor with definite standards for 
making his decision the legislature should direct guidelines of 
prohibited activity."75 One standard that is sure to be struck 
down without question is the denial of a permit to prevent 
possible disorder.
Limits on the location of expression 
What happens when expression occurs in undesirable places? 
Can people march through courtrooms, legislative chambers, 
classrooms, and jail cells? Of course they cannot. But just how 
close can people get to these and other institutions? Groups 
exert their influence by directing their protest and their hate
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at their target, or by petitioning the government via a demon­
stration.
In Edvards v. South Carolina (1963), the Supreme Court 
upheld the right to march. In this case, 187 black student 
demonstrators marched along the South Carolina State House to 
protest against racial discrimination. After forty-five minutes, 
the police ordered them to disperse within another fifteen 
minutes,* after the fifteen minutes elapsed, the demonstrators 
were arrested, tried, and convicted of breach of peace. Justice 
Stewart, speaking for the Court, overturned their convictions. 
Having decided that the protestors were convicted for having 
"stirred people to anger, invited dispute, or brought about a 
condition of unrest,"76 Stewart held that these convictions did 
not come from a narrowly drawn statute and thus, the offense was 
too general. Furthermore, the Court held there was no violence 
or fighting words. Finally, he held that "[t]he 14th Amendment 
does not permit a State to make criminal the peaceful expression 
of unpopular views."77 Although the statute did not involve the 
location of the protest, the opinion did mention that along with 
free speech and assembly, this included the freedom to petition 
the government for redress of grievances "in their most pristine 
and classic form."78 Thus, the Court established that, absent a 
reasonable and narrowly drawn statute, it was going to allow 
demonstrations on the grounds of public buildings.
In Cox v. Louisiana II. which was the second appeal filed in 
the case, the Supreme Court narrowed the broad implications of
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the Edvards ruling. In Cox I. the Court invalidated the convic­
tions by invalidating the statutes outlawing breach of peace and 
obstructing public passages; in the second part, it upheld the 
statute forbidding picketing near a courthouse, while reversing 
the convictions. Goldberg, who wrote for the Court in Cox I. 
wrote the majority opinion in this case, also. He said the 
statute was narrowly drawn as a protection of the judicial 
system; thus, it was valid on its face, and did not ''infringe 
upon the constitutionally protected rights of free speech and 
free assembly."79 Therefore, the statute was a reasonable time, 
place, and manner restriction. After rejecting the clear and 
present danger test, he held that the conviction must be reversed 
on the grounds thit the statute was not violated. In fact, the 
"[a]ppellant was led to believe [by the police] that his demons­
tration on the far side of the street [from the courthouse] 
violated no statute." Moreover, the order to disperse was based 
on "disturbance of the peace," which was invalidated in first 
part of the case. Justice Goldberg then concluded:
[T]he dispersal order had nothing to do with any time 
or place limitation, and thus, on this ground alone, it 
is clear that the dispersal order did not remove the 
protection accorded appellant by the original grant of 
permission.00
Since the demonstration remained as peaceful as when it started, 
the "original grant of permission" was still in effect. Thus, 
the police's order amounted to a indefinite value judgment. An 
interesting dissent in this case was written by Justice Black, 
who claimed that the protection of the judicial process was more
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important than the appellant's "mistaken belief that he and his 
followers had a constitutional right to [demonstrate).1,81 
Black's broad, sweeping solution was too simplistic, as it would 
have granted public authorities the unfettered discretion the 
Court was trying so diligently to prevent. Nevertheless, accord­
ing to the majority, courts could be given special protection, 
but it was still unclear how far outside its doors this realm 
extended.
One answer to the question of just how far the radius of the 
courts' realm extended was in United States v. Grace (1983). 
Justice White, writing for the majority, ruled unconstitutional a 
federal statute which prohibited the "display [of] any flag, 
banner, or device designed or adapted to bring into public notice 
any party, organization, or movement in the Supreme Court build­
ing and its grounds."82 In overturning a conviction for dis­
playing such an item on the sidewalk outside the building, White 
said those sidewalks were indistinguishable from others:
Those sidewalks are used by the public like other 
public sidewalks. There is nothing to indicate to the 
public that these sidewalks are part of the Supreme 
Court grounds or are in any way different from the 
other public sidewalks in the city. We seriously doubt 
that the public would draw a different inference from a 
lone picketer carrying a sign on the sidewalks around 
the building than it would from a similar picket on the 
sidewalks across the street.83
In contrast to Cox, there were no instructions by the police; 
there was merely an arrest based on violation of a statute. 
Furthermore, the Court decided the scope of protection of their 
workplace, and not all courts in general. Taken with Cox, this
means that the protected vicinity of a court must be within a 
reasonably obvious region. It may be that a proper warning by 
the police is the method of defining this boundary. Neverthe­
less , it was clear that to protect a court, a statute was neces­
sary? for example, in Cdhtn.Yt ..CalifPraia (1971), the Supreme
Court dismissed the issue of the offensive speech occurring in a 
courthouse, since no statute forbade it.84
Several other cases involving the location of the protest 
originated in Louisiana, arising out of the Negroes' reactions to 
the state's poor stance on civil rights. In Garner v. Louisiana 
(1961), there was a sit-in by Negroes at a whites-only lunch 
counter? they were convicted of "disturbing the peace," which the 
Supreme Court reversed on the grounds that the demonstration was 
peaceful and did not amount to "passive conduct likely to cause a 
public disturbance."85 In Tavlor v. Louisiana (1965), the sit- 
in by Negroes occurred in a whites-only waiting room at a bus 
station. Their convictions were also overturned Per Curiam by 
the Court, even though white onlookers grew restless.86 These 
cases involved actions that only took the form of a demonstration 
in a racially segregated community? therefore, their convictions 
were the result of blatant discrimination against black people, 
and the Supreme Court recognized this. The facts in Cox v. 
Louisiana (above) were not as obviously racist, but prejudicial 
actions by the police led the Court to reverse the convictions 
anyway•
The facts in Brown v. Louisiana (1966) also arose out of
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this public segregation, as several Negroes were convicted for
holding a sit-in in a public library. However, the larger issue
was the right to hold a peaceful demonstration inside a public
building. The scene consisted of a segregated library system,
in which it appeared that black people could only retain its
services from a specific bookmobile. The "crime14 began when five
young Negro males marched into the library and requested a book;
after the librarian told them the book was unavailable, they
stayed— even after the librarian requested they leav^. When the
sheriff arrived, he asked them to leave, and then arrested them
for refusing to do so. They were soon convicted of breach of
peace and refusing to leave the premises. Justice Fortas,
writing for a plurality of the Court, reversed the breach of
peace convictions. Citing SimttlMWQrth, CQX V» Louisiana, and
other cases, he concluded the 44[petitioners cannot be convicted
merely because they did not comply with an order to leave the
library."87 He then labeled this case as involving protected
symbolic speech and blatant discrimination:
[T]he right under the First and Fourteenth Amendments 
guaranteeing freedom of speech and of assembly, and 
freedom to petition the Government for redress of 
grievances • • • are not confined to verbal expression. 
They embrace appropriate types of action which certain­
ly include the right in a peaceable and orderly manner 
to protest by silent and reproachful presence, in a 
place where the protestant has every right to be, the 
unconstitutional segregation of public facilities.88
Thus, Fortas relied on the right to demonstrate one4s views in
this manner, and their right to use the library peacefully;
however, only Warren and Douglas joined him in this opinion.
Therefore, both Brennan's and White's concurrences also decided 
the case. Brennan held that the breach of peace statute was 
unconstitutional due to "overbreadth," overturning their convic­
tions.69 Justice White, on the other hand, said this was not a 
First Amendment case, and based his opinion on one's right to 
equal protection of the law, saying that "[t]he conclusion that 
petitioners were making only a normal and authorized use of this 
public library requires the reversal of their convictions."90 
Despite the Court's disagreement on how to decide the case, the 
majority did agree that the young men had a right to remain in 
the public library and exercise their right of petition. This 
conclusion is given weight in Black's dissent, when he objected 
to the library being "used for the purpose of conducting pro­
tests. "91
Nevertheless, in that same year, Justice Black got to impose 
his limits on public fora, not to libraries, but to jails. In 
Adderley v. Florida (1966), 32 Florida A & M University students 
were convicted of "trespass with a malicious and mischievous 
intent" for marching from the school to the jail to protest the 
previous arrests of other protesting students.92 Although the 
students claimed their situation fell into the realm of Edwards 
and Cox 1 . Justice Black, writing for the majority, upheld their 
convictions. First, he distinguished this case from Edwards, by 
stating: "Traditionally, state capitol grounds are open to the 
public. Jails, built for security purposes, are not."93 He 
distinguished Cox I. noting that it dealt with a vague statute,
while the present statute specifically outlaws trespassing.
Black then justified the sheriff's authority to order the stu­
dents to leave the jail:
The State, no less than a private owner of property, 
has power to preserve the property under its control 
for the use to which it is lawfully dedicated. For 
this reason there is no merit to petitioners' argument 
that they had a constitutional right to stay on the 
property, over the jail custodian's objections. . . . 
The [Constitution] does not forbid a State to control 
the use of its own property for its own property for 
its own lawful nondiscriminatory purpose."94
Black's majority opinion looks a lot like his dissent in Brown v.
Louisiana. This seems to imply that the Court was willing to
protect First Amendment freedoms in some places but not others.
Just what other places besides jails and courthouses were to be
restricted was uncertain.
Another public building the Supreme Court had the opportu­
nity to grant or deny public forum at was the school. In Police 
Department of Chicago v. Moslev (1972), the Court invalidated a 
statute which prohibited all picketing except those involving 
labor disputes within 150 feet of a school. Marshall, writing 
for the majority, said that "[t]he central problem with Chicago's 
ordinance is that it describes the permissible picketing in terms 
of subject matter." He went on to say that this violated the 
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, as well as 
the First Amendment.95
On the same day, the Court shed some light on the restric­
tions allowed on school grounds. In G rayned v . Rockford (1972), 
it upheld a statute that prohibited noise on grounds adjacent to
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the school that would disturb a class in session. The appellant 
was in a mass demonstration in front of a high school and was 
convicted of violating this statute. Justice Marshall, writing 
for the majority, said that ,fthe nature of the place" made the 
statute a reasonable "time, place, and manner" restriction. 
Marshall went on to say:
[The ordinance is] narrowly tailored to further Rock­
ford's compelling interest in having an undisrupted 
school session conducive to the students' learning, and 
does not unnecessarily interfere with First Amendment 
rights.96
Here, the Court used the compelling interest test to balance the 
interest of the school with the First Amendment; since the means 
were necessary, the Court upheld the statute.
Some other public institutions include parks, malls, and 
foreign embassies. In Clark v. Community Far Creative Non- 
Violence (1984), the Court upheld an statute that prohibited 
camping in certain parks in Washington D.C. CCNV, while trying 
to help the homeless, was allowed to demonstrate in Lafayette 
Park and the Mall. When the group wanted to sleep overnight in 
these places, in order to make a statement and get more homeless 
people in the demonstration, they were denied because of anti­
camping regulations. Justice White, writing for the Court, said 
that "overnight sleeping in connection with the demonstration is 
expressive conduct protected to some extent by the First Amend­
ment, . • • [and] subject to reasonable time, place, and manner 
restrictions.1,97 He then applied the O'Brien test, with the 
three tracks proceeding as follows: (1) prohibiting camping
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furthers the "Governments substantial interest in maintaining 
the parks"; (2) the governmental "interest is unrelated to 
suppression of expression”; and (3) tne governmental interest of 
protecting the park is greater than the First Amendment interest 
in facilitating the demonstration.98
The Court decided on the status of foreign embassies, in 
Boos v. Barry (1988). A District of Columbia statute forbade 
displays offensive to foreign governments and prohibited congreg­
ations, except those involving labor disputes with those build­
ings, within 500 feet of any foreign embassy. Boos, and two 
others, sued for the right to display signs critical of the 
governments of Nicaragua and the Soviet Union and to congregate 
on the sidewalks within 500 feet of both embassies. Justice 
O'Connor, writing for the Court, held: the display clause, due to 
its content-based nature, violated the First Amendment the 
congregation clause was narrowly tailored; and the labor picket 
provision did not violate equal protection.99 Foreign embas­
sies, as well as parks and malls in our capitol, received some 
but not absolute protection.
Another government institution is the military. Are its 
buildings and bases given special protection? In Bachellar v. 
Maryland (1970), Justice Brennan implied that their recruiting 
stations did not have a special status, while upholding the right 
to hold a sit-in in the stations. There was an antiwar demon­
stration in front of an Army Recruiting Station, after which they 
had a brief sit-in inside the station. The demonstrators were
then arrested and convicted of disturbing the peace. Brennan 
said that the jury instructions suggested the petitioners may 
have been convicted because their views were "offensive to some
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of their hearers." This type of conviction would be unconstitu­
tional, so the Court overturned them.100 Here, Brennan did not 
really deal with the status of the recruiting station, but rather 
concentrated on chipping away at the incitement test.
However, the status of military bases was the main issue in 
United States v. Albertini. (1985). Albertini was barred from 
entering Hickam Air Force Base in Hawaii, without written permis­
sion, as a result of having been convicted, in 1972, of con­
spiracy to destroy government property. Ir. 1981, on Armed Forces 
Day, while taking part in a peaceful demonstration that the 
general public was allowed to partake in, Albertini was arrested 
and convicted for entering the base. O'Connor, writing the 
opinion for the Court, upheld Albertini's conviction, dismissing 
his protest activity as irrelevant:
Respondent was prosecuted not for demonstrating at the 
open house, but for reentering the base after he had 
been ordered not to do so. [The power of a commanding 
officer to exclude should not] be analyzed in the same 
manner as government regulation of a traditional public 
forum simply because an open house was held at Hick­
am. 101
Thus, the Court avoided conflict with the military, and allowed 
them to control their own space. However, this case and fitchfl- 
lar leave a lot of middle ground? for now, it is safe to say that 
military bases can be regulated by the military , while their 
recruiting stations may be open to any peaceful public demonstra­
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tions.
Finally, are private homes safe from the intrusion of 
unwanted expression? The Court began to answer this question in 
Gregory v. City of Chicago (1969). In this case, Gregory led a 
march from city hall to the front of Mayor Daley’s home to 
protest his failure to desegregate the schools. A hostile crowd 
gathered and threw rocks and eggs at the demonstrators. Tryi g 
to prevent a riot, the police ordered the demonstrators to 
disperse, and when they refused, arrested them for disorderly 
conduct. The Supreme Court unanimously reversed. Chief Justice 
Warren, writing for a five-person majority, held that since there 
was no disorderly conduct, the statute was not violated. He also 
held that their conduct was protected by the First Amendment.
The Court dismissed the issue of the refusal to disperse.102 It 
also seemed to assume that picketing in front of the Mayor's homo 
was acceptable.
The facts of Carey v * Brown (1980) were similar to QregQXy. 
In 1977, a demonstration was held in front of Mayor Bilandis* 
home in Chicago, protesting his failure to support the busing of 
school children to achieve racial integration. The protesters 
were arrested and convicted under an Illinois statute that made 
it ’’unlawful to picket before or about the residence or dwelling 
of any person, except when [used] as a place of business.”103 
Brennan, writing the opinion of the Court, said the statute was 
"constitutionally indistinguishable from the ordinance invalidat­
ed in Mosely. [for it] accords preferential treatment [to] labor
disputes, . . . but discussion of all other issues is restrict­
ed.**104 Since the statute was content-based, the privacy of the 
home was not considered. Yet, the Court reaffirmed that labor 
protests were not more important than other kinds of protests.
Gregory and Carey represented the government's failed at­
tempts to protect the home; but these cases, along with others, 
such as Mosely. taught legislatures a valuable lesson in how to 
draft a statute for that purpose. This is what happened in 
Frisbv v. Schultz (1988), which took place in Brookfield, Wiscon- 
sin. Schultz and others held an anti-abortion protest outside 
the home of a doctor who performed abortions, and although it was 
orderly and peaceful, it was held at least six times in a month. 
In the midst of this picket, the .own passed an ordinance identi­
cal to the one in Carey, but the town attorney noticed this 
mistake and they passed a new one. The ordinance made it "unlaw­
ful for any person to engage in picketing before ot about the 
residence or dwelling of any individual, [the purpose being] the 
protection and preservation of the home."105 The appellees 
ceased picketing when the ordinance went into effect and sued 
under the First Amendment. Justice 0*Connor wrote the opinion 
for the Court, upholding the ordinance as "content neutral."106 
She applied the overbreadth doctrine to the statute as applied, 
and concluded;
The First Amendment permits the government to prohibit 
offensive speech as intrusive when the "captive" 
audience cannot avoid the objectionable speech. . . • 
Because the picketing prohibited by the Brookfield 
ordinance is speech directed primarily at those who are 
presumptively unwilling to receive it, the State has a
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substantial and justifiable interest in banning it.107 
Thus, the Court held that the home is protected. Furthermore, 
this case was consistent with Black*s analysis (above) in Adder* 
ley, where he equated the government and private property owners, 
while saying jails were off-limits to demonstrations; it would 
then follow that the private property owner could be free from 
the same unnecessary intrusion. Although the :ourt in Frisby did 
not use this analysis, it was interesting to note its consistency 
in this area.
Clothing As a Political Statement 
This section deals with people making themselves a symbol of 
their cause, by wearing something that conveys a message. This 
means that it involves much more than marching through the 
streets with signs and delivering speeches. Turning one's 
physical self into a statement has all the freedoms and restric­
tions that the various marches, sit-ins, and demonstrations has; 
however, it is still a different issue. Nevertheless, the Court 
has been very supportive of individual freedom in this area, as 
it tended to label this as "pure speech."
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community Schoomstrict 
(1969) dealt with more than whether one could wear armbands to 
protest the Vietnam war, but It also involved whether students 
could do so in a public school. This makes this case relevant to 
the above discussion of where public forum is or is not granted. 
Incidently, this case was decided before Grayned and Moselv. the
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school cases limiting expression on school grounds. The case
involved a decision by a group of adults and students to wear
black armbands to protest the war; when the principals of the Des
Moines schools heard of this nlan, they banned the wearing of
armbands. The students were aware of this new rule, but they
wore them anyway, and were suspended from school for doing so.
Their fathers filed a complaint in their name, which eventually
made its way to the Supreme Court. In his majority opinion,
Justice Fortas cited Cox and Adderly. and stated:
[T]he wearing of armbands in the circumstances of this 
case was entirely divorced from actually or potentia 11V 
disruptive conduct by those participating in it. It 
was closely akin to "pure speech*1 which we have 
repeatedly held, is entitled to comprehensive protec­
tion under the First Amendment.108
Fcrtas held that this clothing was indeed speech, and not ,,speech
plus" as symbolic expression normally is. Furthermore, the
conduct was passive, and did not disrupt other students' right to
education. He then went on to say that "students or teachers [do
not] shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or
expression at the schoolhouse gate," and concluded that the
school officials' intent was to punish this protected speech.109
Both the student's right to passive protest in school, as well as
the wearing of clothing being protected speech, were established.
Schacht v. United States (1970) was decided a year later, 
and it involved a the conviction of a man who performed a skit in 
a military uniform to protest the Vietnam war. Justice Black, 
writing for a unanimous Court, overturned this conviction as a 
violation of First Amendment freedoms. Black addressed section
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702 of a statute that prohibited the wearing of a military
uniform without permission; he also considered the exception in
section 772, which granted permission to "theatrical or motion-
picture productions . . .  if the portrayal does not tend to
discredit that armed force.1'110 After establishing that
Schacht's skit was a "theatrical production," the Court concluded
that with these two sections put together, it was clear:
Congress has in effect made it a crime for an actor 
wearing a military uniform to say things during his 
performance critical of the conduct or policies of the 
Armed Forces. . . . [Thus], his conviction can be sus­
tained only if he can be punished for speaking out 
against the role of our Army and our country in Viet­
nam. Clearly punishment for this reason would be an 
unconstitutional abridgment of freedom of speech. The 
final clause of section 772 . . . must be stricken from 
the section.111
The Court recognized that Schacht's theatrical conduct deserved 
the protection of speech, and overturned his conviction, while 
invalidating the part of the relevant statute that restricted 
speech. The Court did not even consider using the clear and 
present danger, incitement, or any other test that justified 
restrictions on freedom of expression; this reluctance to re­
strict expression suggests that the Court put the threat of the 
Vietnam war on the same level Holmes put that of Russia in 
Abrams. Nevertheless, the Court's main concern was that actors 
had a right to free expression, and that a statute unconstitu­
tionally abridged that right.
One year later, in Cohen v. California (1971), the Court 
reversed the conviction of Cohen, who displayed his negative 
views of the Vietnam War, by parading in a courthouse with a
41
jacket bearing the inscription, "Fuck the Draft.1' He was con­
victed for violating a statute prohibiting "maliciously and will­
fully disturb!ing] the peace or quiet of any neighborhood or 
person by offensive conduct."112 Harlan wrote the opinion for 
the Court; he said that under O'Brien, conduct could be regu­
lated, while the restricton of speech had limits. He breathed 
meaning into this idea, when he stated that the conviction,
then, rests squarely upon his exercise of the "freedom 
of speech" [and] can be justified, if at all, only as a 
valid regulation of the manner in which he exercised 
that freedom, not as a permissible prohibition on the 
substantive message it conveys.113
First, Harlan inquired into this possibility of a time, place,
and manner restriction; the fact that it was in a courthouse was
irrelevant because the issue was not in the statute. Second, the
notion of obscenity was rejected; the words on th^ draft would
not likely have sexual connotations for its viewers. Third, the
fighting words doctrine of Chaolinsky did not apply because the
four letter word was not directed to a particular person.
Finally, the unwilling viewer need not be protected outside of
the home. Justice Harlan then summed this up by saying that the
remote possibility of incitement to violence does not give a
"governmental power to force persons who wish to ventilate their
views into avoiding particular forms of expression."114 Thus,
the wearing o* an obscene word to express one's views was
protected speech under the First and Fourteenth Amendments.
This type of expression presented an interesting issue, as 
derogatory statements on clothing since this case have included
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those against Iran and various athletic teams. These modes of 
expression have been commonly looked upon as a harmless way of 
venting out aggressions. Perhaps it was better to display hatred 
on jackets and T-shirts than to resort to violence.
The next case involved hatred for a group, but on a much 
grander scale. This was the Nazi's hatred of Jews; not only did 
they want to express their hate publically, but they wished to do 
so in Skokie, Illinois, a predominantly Jewish community, with 
their uniforms, swastikas, armbands, and signs. Although the 
group said they would not obstruct traffic, distribute litera­
ture, or make any derogatory statements towards any group, an 
injunction was obtained against them, preventing them from 
promoting their cause. This set the scene for National Socialist
Par ty.,Y» (1977). in a Per Curiam opinion, the Supreme
Court invalidated Skokie's use of the injunction as a procedural 
process that effectively deprived the group of their First 
Amendment rights:
If a State seeks to impose a restraint of this kind, it 
must provide strict procedural safeguards, Freedman, 
including immediate appellate review. Absent such 
review, the State must instead allow a stay.115
because of the long time it took to appeal, the Court concluded
that this amounted to a denial of First Amendment rights.
This case presented an important issue: can groups that were 
hated for their inhumane acts in the past be allowed to exist and 
air their views? The Court moved away from its position of 
restricting the actions of such groups, as it has done from World 
War I through post World War IT to a more tolerant view. In an
essay criticizing this case, as well as this path the Court has 
followeo, Will complained that "(a]fter 60 years of liberal 
construction of the First Amendment, almost anything counts as 
'speech1; almost nothing justifies restriction."116 On the 
other side of the issue, the ACLU supported the Nazis' rights in 
this case, saying: "[t]he principles of the First Amendment are 
indivisible. Extend them on behali of one group, and they 
protect all groups. Deny them to on*- iroup, and all groups 
suffer." They concluded by stating: "We cannot remain faithful 
to the First Amendment by turning our backs when it is put to its 
^  erest test— the right to freedom of speech for those whose 
views we despise the most."117 The Court seems to have taken 
the ACLU's position with freedom of expression when the person 
becomes a symbol by virtue of his clothing. This kind of speech 
has been given the status of a passive form of expression that 
has few, if any, restrictions on its use.
Expression Involving Flags and Draft Cards 
The last category deals with one's right to display and 
treat various flags in any manner, especially "Old Glory," an* 
the right to burn one's draft card. The significance of these 
actions is that in private, they usually fall under conduct; 
however, when one publically performs these actions, they take 
the form of speech. For example, the proper way to dispose of a 
flag is to burn it, which is acceptable conduct; but when someone 
burns the flag in the street as a statement against the govern*
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merit, it becomes a form of speech that is socially unacceptable. 
This behavior has a conduct element more similar to marches than 
to that of wearing clothing, for clothing is passive and more 
speech-oriented, while marches and the present category consist 
of conduct that becomes speech.
In £trffilfcsrg Vt California (1931), the Supreme Court over­
turned a conviction for the displaying of a red flag— the symbol 
of Russia, A day-camp instructor taught children communist ideas 
and led them in a daily ceremony in which they raised the red 
lag and cited a pledge of allegiance to this communist flag.
She was then convicted under a State statute which said:
Any person who displays a red flag . . .  in any public 
place or in any meeting place . . . [1] as a sign, 
symbol, or emblem of opposition to organized government 
or [2] as an invitation or stimulus to anarchist action 
or [3] as an aid to propaganda that is of seditious 
character is guilty of a felony.118
Chief Justice Hughes, writing for the majority, said that the
jury verdict was "a general one" that could have equally relied
on any of the three parts of this statute.119 After he stated
that "liberty under the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment embraces the right of free speech, Gitlow. Whitney.
Hughes noted the right was not "an absolute one."120 
Within this context, he concluded the second and third clauses of 
the statute were valid within the state's power to punish those 
whose words "incite to violence • . • and threaten the overthrow 
of organized government." However, the first clause was struck 
down, for It had the possibility of prohibiting opposition to the 
political party in power:
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The maintainance of the opportunity for free political 
discussion to the end that government may be respon­
sible to the will of the people and that changes may be 
obtained by lawful means, an opportunity essential to 
the security of the Republic, is a fundamental prin­
ciple of our constitutional system. A statute which is 
so vague and indefinite as to permit the punishment of 
the fair use of this opportunity is repugnant to the 
guaranty of liberty contained in the Fourteenth Amend- 
went.121
Having said this, the Chief Justice held the first portion of the 
statute unconstitutional, and while he reversed the conviction, 
he remanded the case to be redecided on the grounds of the second 
and third clauses of the statute. Emerson said the Court "paid 
remarkably little attention to the fundamental question of defin­
ing ‘expression* and ‘action,*** and that **the Supreme Court had 
assumed that displaying a red flag as a symbol of opposition to 
organized government constituted expression, but had not 
elaborated upon that position."122 This was true, for the Court 
had not yet formulated a theory in this area. Many years later, 
when it did have a theory, the Supreme Court struck down a 
similar provision in Boos v, Barry (1988); the only real dif­
ference was that this statute used the word "sign'* instead of 
"flag," and it was protect foreign governments at their embassies 
instead of the American government.123
The flag salute cases stand out in this line of cases, for 
it involved the right not to perform a conduct with symbolic 
importance; this non-performance became symbolic expression in 
itself. The interesting point was that the first case was 
overruled by the second only three years later. In Minersville 
School District v. Cobltis (1940), the Court upheld the expulsion
of Jehovah's Witnesses children from school for refusing to
salute the flag. Although the refusal was for religious beliefs,
Justice Frankfurter, writing for the Court, said these beliefs
were outweighed by the need for "national unity" and judicial
deference to the legislature in this area. He concluded:
[F]or us to insist that, though the ceremony (of salut­
ing the flag] may be required, exceptional immunity 
must be given to dissidents, is to maintain that there 
is no basis for a legislative judgment that such an ex­
emption might introduce elements of difficulty into the 
school discipline, might cast doubts in the minds of 
other children which would themselves weaken the effect 
of the exercise.1*4
Thus, a student could be required to salute the flag.
Sttb.lt.ls was overruled in West ..Virginia St-fltS -Board ttl
EflygatittP-V.1 .Barnetts (1943). The Board of Education, in
response to the Gobitis decision, made a resolution that all
teachers and pupils "shall be required to participate in the
salute honoring the Nation by the Flag; provided, however, that
refusal [is] an act of insubordination, and shall be dealt with
accordingly."125 This case also dealt with children of the
Jehovah's Witnesses faith refusing to salute the flag because of
their religious beliefs. Justice Jackson, writing for the
majority, dismissed the religious freedom issue, held that the
Fourteenth Amendment's hold on the states applied to a state
board of education, and that the mandatory salute violated the
First and Fourteenth Amendments.126 Jackson delivered the final
blow to the Board of Education's rule, as well as Gobitis:
[No] official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall 
be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or 
other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess
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by word or act their faith therein. If there are any 
circumstances which permit an exception, they do not 
now occur to us.127
Thus, compulsory saluting of the flag violated freedom of expres­
sion under due process, and Gobitis was overruled. Frankfurter, 
the author of the opinion in Gobitis, wrote a strong dissent in 
this case; he accused the majority of policy-making, and, citing 
Holmes, he said that this was a decision to be left to the 
legislature. He then stipulated:
[T]his Court's only and very narrow function is to 
determine whether within the broad grant of authority 
vested in the legislatures they have exercised a judge­
ment for which reasonable justification can be of­
fered. 128
Nevertheless, according to the Iowa Law Review, this case and 
Strombera meant "the state cannot explicitly punish unpatriotic 
expression even if it takes a form other than free speech."129
This next case was decided over two decades later, in the 
heat of the Vietnam War. Often referred to as the draft card 
ourning case, U.nitftd S a.Y.» .Qlflr.lgfl (1968) involved a convic­
tion for burning a selective service card. O'Brien and three 
others burned their draftcards on the steps of a courthouse; the 
FBI arrested him, and he was later convicted under a 1965 amend­
ment that added the words, "knowingly destroys, knowingly mutil­
ates," to an already existing statute, so that it made it an 
offense to anyone, "who forges, alters, knowingly destroys, 
knowingly mutilates, or in any manner changes any such certific­
ate."110 Chief Justice Warren, writing for the majority, upheld 
the conviction. He first affirmed the validity of the statute,
48
as amended, as Mnot abridging] free speech on its face,'*:
[W]hen "speech11 and "nonspeech" elements are combined 
in the same course of conduct, a sufficiently important 
governmental interest in regulating the nonspeech 
element can justify incidental limitations on First 
Amendment freedoms.131
He then created a formula known as his "three step-two track" 
theory of scrutinizing these regulations (a detailed account of 
this is in the Doctrines chapter).'32 He affirmed Congress' 
power to issue the draft as "beyond question," and thus, "legisl­
ation to insure the continuing availability of issued certifi­
cates serves a legitimate and substantial purpose." He then 
described these purposes as: a proof of registration? a facilita­
tion of communication? a reminder to the registrant? and prevent­
ing forgeries of such certificates.133 Then, he concluded:
We perceive no alternative means that would more 
precisely and narrowly assure the continuing 
availability of issued Selective Service certificates 
than a law which prohibits their wilful mutilation or 
destruction. . . • The 1965 Amendment prohibits such 
conduct and does nothing more. . . . [Thus], [f]or this 
noncommunicative impact of his conduct, and for nothing 
else, [O'Brien] was convicted.134
Since this statute was narrowly tailored to prohibit conduct, the 
case was distinguished from Stromberg. where the Court had 
stricken part of a statute chat suppressed expression. Having 
said this, Warren quickly set aside O'Brien's objections to 
Congress' motives: "this Court will not strike down an otherwise 
constitutional statute on the basis of an alleged illicit legis­
lative motive"? he later said that it was the "inevitable effect" 
of the legislation, not the "motive" that was the deciding factor 
in previous cases.133 It has been this second part of the rul-
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ing that has drawn the most criticism from constitutional schol­
ars.
Several scholars suggested that Congress intended to sup­
press speech when it passed the 1965 amendment, including Emer­
son136 and Alfange. Dean Alfange, Jr., then an assistant Profes­
sor at the University of Massachusetts, pointed out that students 
have been burning their draft cards long before Q*Brien: after 
which they would apply for new ones. Even the military did not 
have any serious objections; when five people burned their cards 
in New York City in 1965, Colonel Akst, director of Selective 
Service for the city, said: "It's just a nuisance. They'll just 
come in to their local boards and get a duplicate card."137 
Despite the military's virtual disinterest in the matter, Con­
gress made an issue out of suppressing this widespread form of 
dissent against the war with the passage of the Rivers amendment, 
in 1965. Alfange specifically criticised Warren for "treat[ing] 
the amendment essentially without reference to the context in 
which it was enacted."138 Realizing that courts try to avoid 
second-guessing the motives of the legislature, Alfange said the 
courts would not have to confront the legislature but could look 
for a "repressive effect" on liberty that overrides a "valid 
public interest."139 Basically, the Court should have taken a 
closer look at the relevant facts surrounding the case before it 
passed judgment; Warren failed to do this, as he placed a 
military interest on a disinterested military by saying the draft 
card burnings were meant to directly disrupt the war effort,
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rather than recognize it as symbolic expression that was intended 
to convey a message.
The next four cases deal with flag desecration; one issue 
running through these cases is the government's interest in 
prohibiting this symbolic speech in the name of preserving the 
sanctity of the flag as a symbol of national unity. Street v.
New York (1969) completely avoided this issue, with Justice 
Harlan deciding this case on the words spoken against the flag. 
Street, took the flag out to the street, put it on newspaper so 
it would not touch the ground, burned it, and cried out: "We 
don't need no damn flag.',uo He was convicted of a New York 
statute that forbids one to "mutilate, deface, defile, or defy, 
to trample upon or cast contempt upon either by words or act [any 
flag of the United States]."141 Harlan held that this provision 
"was unconstitutionally applied in [his] case because it permit­
ted him to be punished merely for speaking defiant or contemptu­
ous words about the American flag."142 He then applied balanc­
ing tests to four possible state interests and concluded that 
Street: (1) could not be prohibited from advocating "peaceful 
change"; (2) did not use "fighting words" fChaplinskvl; (3) could 
not be stifled because he may offend somebody; and (4) had the 
right to differ from "the heart of the existing order [which] 
encompasses the freedom to express publically one's opinion about 
our flag." fBarnette I143 This case provided a clear guideline 
for the use of words spoken against the flag, but, due to Har­
lan's avoidance of the issue, gave no clear guidelines as to what
conduct against the flag was permissible. At best, it appeared 
that flag desecration was protected speech.
This question was slowly answered by the Court, and in 1974, 
two such cases were decided. In Smith v. Goquen (1974), the 
Supreme Court overturned the conviction of a man who wore an 
American flag patch on the seat of his pants, because the statute 
that forbade "contemptuous** treatment of the flag was void for 
vagueness.144 This case did not say much about flag desecra­
tion, either, because the Court was merely dealing with a poorly 
drawn statute.
However, the second case of the year, Spence v. Washington 
(1974) did deal with the issue, as the Supreme Court overturned 
Spence*s conviction for displaying the flag with a peace symbol 
on it. However, as the facts show, Spence was a peaceful man who 
had the utmost respect for the flag. He displayed his American 
flag out his window, with a peace symbol made of removable tape 
upon the flag. When the police entered his apartment, Spence 
offered to remove the flag, but they arrested him anyway; he was 
then tried and convicted under a Washington "improper use" 
statute.145 Spence said that he did this to protest the invasion 
of Cambodia and the killings at Kent State, and he "wanted people 
to know [he] thought America stood for peace"; furthermore, he 
said he used tape so that he could remove the peace symbol 
without damaging the flag.146 The Court decided this case Per 
Curiam, in favor of Spence. First, four important factors were 
noted by the Court: (1) he owned the flag; (2) he displayed it on
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private property? (3) he committed no breach of peace? and (4) he 
''engaged in a form of communication."147 Concluding that Spence 
did not violate the statute and did not ruin the flag, the Court 
said:
Given the protected character of his expression and in 
light of the fact that no interest the State may have 
in preserving the physical integrity of a privately 
owned flag was significantly impaired by these facts, 
the conviction must be invalidated.148
The Court made it clear that a privately owned American flag 
could be used to convey a message, but as Shapiro pointed out, 
the Court "carefully avoided holding that desecration or destruc­
tion of the flag was constitutionally protected.1,149
However, in Texas v, Johnson (1989), the Supreme Court met 
the issue of flag desecration head-on. The Court overturned 
Johnson's conviction for burning the flag as a violation of the 
First Amendment as applied to the states by the Fourteenth.
During a protest of the Reagan Administration, outside of the 
place the 1984 Republican National Convention was being held, 
Johnson set fire to a flag that someone took down from a flag 
pole, while he and his fellow protestors chanted: "America, the 
red, white, and blue, we spit on you."150 Johnson was the only 
one of the 100 demonstrators who was tried, and he was subse­
quently convicted under a Texas flag desecration statute, which 
made it illegal to:
deface, damage, or otherwise physically mistreat [a 
state or national flag] in a way that the actor knows 
will seriously offend one or more persons likely to 
observe or discover his action.151
Justice Brennan, writing for the majority, overturned this
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conviction and struck down the statute. Using the Obrien test, 
he decided that, given the facts of the case, "Johnson's burning 
of the flag was 'sufficiently imbued with elements of communica­
tion,' Spence, to implicate the First Amendment."152 Having 
decided that burning the flag was symbolic expression, Brennan 
dealt with the State's interest in "preventing breaches of the 
peace and preserving the flag as a symbol of nationhood and 
national unity."153 He decided that no breach of peace oc­
curred, since: his symbolic expression did not constitute "incit­
ing or producing imminent lawless action," Brandenburg? and it 
did not fall into the "small class of 'fighting words,'" Chaplin- 
sky. Brennan clarified that the State could prevent these 
things, but they just did not exist in this case.154 Citing 
Spence, the Court concluded that the State interest of preserving 
the status of the flag was related "to the suppression of free 
expression," removing the analysis from the O'Brien test.155 
Citing Boos as an indicator that Johnson was convicted for the 
content of his message, Brennan subjected the State's interest to 
"the most exacting scrutiny," a means-ends test.156 He employed 
an extensive case history, first conci idling:
If there is a bedrock principle underlying the First 
Amendment, it is that the Government may not prohibit 
the expression of an idea simply because society finds 
the idea itself offensive or disagreeable.157
His second conclusion was based on the other flag cases--Street.
Barnette. 2£ftD£fi, fiflgugn~*nd "nothing in [these] precedents
suggests that a State may foster its own view of the flag by
prohibiting expressive conduct relating to it."158 He connected
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these two ideas, by saying:
[The Court) would be permitting a State to ’'prescribe 
what shall be orthodox" by saying that one may burn the 
flag to convey one's attitude toward it and its ref­
erents only if one does not endanger the flag's repre­
sentation of nationhood and national unity. . . .  To 
conclude that the Government may permit designated 
symbols to be used to communicate only a limited set of 
messages would be to enter territory having no discer- 
nable or defensible boundaries.159
Thus, the means the State used to achieve legitimate ends were
wrong. He then said that allowing this would mean the Court
would have to impose its own viewpoint on the people, which was
forbidden by the First Amendment, Carey. Furthermore, Brennan
found that the special status of the flag was nowhere to be found
in the Constitution.160 Thus, Johnson's burning of the flag was
symbolic expression protected by the First Amendment.
Ideologically speaking, the Court should have voted in favor 
of the state in this case, but two conservatives— Scalia and Ken­
nedy— joined the majority. Kennedy offered some explanation for 
this switch in his concurring opinion:
The hard fact is that sometimes we must make decisions 
we do not like. We make them because they are right, 
right in the sense that the U w  and the Constitution, 
as we see them, compel the result. And so great is our 
commitment to the process that, except in t^e rare 
case, we do not pause to express distaste for the 
result, perhaps for fear of undermining a valued prin­
ciple that dictates the decision. This is one of those 
rare cases. 01
Kennedy was calling for judicial affirmation of a fundamental 
freedom, as well as putting one's emotions aside.
Rehnquist's dissent in this case had a different perspec­
tive. He illustrated the use of the flag in various wars, as
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well as an extensive legislative interest in preserving the flag?
this led to his conclusion that the "flag is not simply another
'idea* or ’point of view1 competing for recognition in the
marketplace of ideas.1*162 Rehnquist stated;
[F]lag burning is the equivalent of an inarticulate 
grunt [that does not] express any particular idea,
[thus it] was Johnson's use of this particular symbol, 
and not the idea that he sought to convey by it or by 
his many other expressions, for which he was 
punished.163
The decision stirred up a lot of controversy? in a nation that
loves its Constitution, country, and flag, an attack on those
institutions will meet serious opposition. President Bush said:
1 believe that the flag of the United States should 
never be the object of desecration. Flag burning is 
wrong. Protection of the flag— a unique national 
symbol--will in no way limit the opportunity nor the 
breadth of protest available in the exercise of free 
speech rights.164
Overturning this ruling became a bi-partisan issue in Congress? 
the only difference was that the Republicans wanted a constitu­
tional amendment, while the Democrats wanted a new, revised 
statute. The latter won out and passed through both houses by 
overwhelming majorities. However, some scholars, such as Univer­
sity of Virginia Professor O'Brien, thought the decision was 
within the spirit of the First Amendment, and believed its 
author, Madison, "would have had his heart warmed by the decis- 
ion."14*
From the flag and draft card cases, it seems the Court's 
position is that freedom of expression that involves a governmen­
tal or national item can only be suppressed if the government's
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interest can only be furthered by the absolute protection of that 
item. National unity can be furthered by means other than by the 
flag, but the efficient running of the draft needed the selective 
service card.
Conclusions
Freedom of symbolic expression is a cherished value in this 
country. The right to belong to a group, regardless of what it 
stands for, has become increasingly important with the massive 
rise in interest groups. These interest groups, in turn, are 
involved in many of these expressive conduct cases, such as the 
demonstration for the homeless in Clark v. Community For Creative 
Non-Violence and the numerous civil rights cases rising involving 
groups like CORE. Public forum is granted unless the government 
has a legitimate interest in restricting it, such as preserving 
the right to education and requiring permits. One can freely 
become a symbol by what one wears. Finally, destruction of one's 
own property is protected expression, provided it does not 
interfere with the necessary means of the government, as burning 
a draft card did in O'Brien.
These four categories make a nice little picture of freedom 
of symbolic expression, but does it mean we are really free to 
conduct ourselves to make a statement as long as we follow these 
guidelines? In an essay on American democracy, Zinn said that 
the rich have more freedom of expression than the poor because 
they could use peaceful and effective means, such as the media.
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However, the poor do not have that option, as he argues: "Anyone 
who in penniless had better have a loud voice? and then he might 
be arrested for disturbing the peace*"166 In these cases, that 
"loud voice" is the use of conduct. Martin Luther King recog­
nized the value of this:
Nonviolent action, the Negro saw, was the way to sup­
plement, not replace, the process of change. It was 
the way to divest himself of passivity without arraying 
himself in vindicative force. 67
Vet, these passive resistors get arrested, dragged through the 
streets, thrown into jail, and are subjected to the ordeal of a 
trial? then, the Supreme Court says the protestor was right. It 
is also true that some avoid this by suing for their rights 
beforehand, but then their rights are also abridged through 
delay? this point was made by the Supreme Court in the Skokie 
case. The government is trying to keep order the best it can, 
while preserving individual liberties. This does not guarantee 
justice in every case, but it leads to a gradual conception of 
what justice is— forming a sort of Socratic notion of resolving 
problems. The questions are raised by legislation and individu­
als, while the answers are made by tne courts and through the 
amending process. Despite the individual attempts to chip away 
at freedom of symbolic expression, it has become a truly recog­
nized concept in the American conscience. Nevertheless, we must 
look outside our country's borders to gain a more objective look 
at this freedom.
A COMPARISON WITHINT1RNATI0NAL TRENDS
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At first glance, it appears that the United States's record 
on freedom of expression is extremely liberal compared with other 
nations. Iran just recently sentenced a man to death for a book 
he wrote, exposing what a rigid and tyrannical regime Khomeini 
was running. Not long after this, the Chinese military put down 
a peaceful demonstration in Tiananmen Square by opening fire on 
the protestors; this situation parallels Clark v. Community For 
Creati v e in that it occurred in the nation's 
capitol, but contrasts it in t'-at the United States allows such 
conduct. However, these two events were so repressive that they 
shocked most of the world, so it is a better idea to look at some 
of those "shocked" nations.
Several international agreements have much to say about 
freedom of expression. First, the United Nation's Universal
DOS 1aration- Of Human.aigkta, Which many countries follow, has
several passages that look very much like our First Amendments 
Article Nineteen states that "[e]veryone has the right to freedom 
of opinion and expression," while Article Twenty guarantees the 
"right to freedom of peaceful assembly and association."168 
Second, the European Conventionfor the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms affirms these same liberties.16’ 
The important aspect of this is not the fact that these words 
exist in writing, but rather that it rests on the idea that 
several nations, believing so strongly in these freedoms, came 
together to affirm that belief.
One of these nations is West Germany, one of the most
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sociologically and economically successful countries in the 
world.170 This nation1?, constitution, the Basic Law, includes: 
freedom of expression "in speech, writing, and pictures": freedom 
of "unarmed" assembly; and a prohibition on prior restraints.171 
Although the Nazi and Communist parties were found to be uncon* 
stitutional in 1952 and 1956, respectively, this grew out of a 
justification similar to Holmes' clear and present danger stan­
dard.
Another nation that believes in individual liberties is 
Great Britain. The especially important aspect of using Britain 
as a comparison is that the United States' common law grew out of 
England's until the revolutionary war; this amounts to an ex­
periment designed to discover what effect several variables— such 
as federalism, a Constitution, the First and Fourteenth Amend­
ments, and a Supreme Court with the power of judicial review- 
have on English common law. For the sake of brevity, this will 
be done with a comparison of symbolic expression cases with 
similar facts. Britain has no written constitution, and the 
courts lack the power of judicial review— thus, the courts merely 
interpret acts of Parliament.
First, groups have more rights in America than in Britain.
In R. v. Jordan and Tvndall (1963), the Spearhead association 
were found guilty of existing as a violent organization, for "it 
was not necessary that there should be evidence of actual attacks 
or plans for attacks on opponents.1,172 This contrasts the right 
to take part in a meeting in DeJonae. as well as imminent lawless
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action being necessary to convict in Brandenburg -173 In 
v . Buraovne (1963), Jordan, the leader of the British fascists, 
was convicted of using insulting words against Jews, as the 
British court proclaimed: "A person is entitled to express his 
views as strongly as he likes, to criticize and to say disagree­
able things about his opponents; but he must not threaten, abuse 
or insult by using 'hitting words, ",m This looks a lot like 
the "fighting words" doctrine in Chaplinsky.175
Second, the right to public forum is fairly similar in both 
nations. In &gr..QW§mlth Vi venKin* (1963), a conviction for 
willful obstruction of a highway was upheld, although Miss 
Arrowhead did not intend to obstruct the highway. This contrasts 
the Supreme Court's rejection of the "obstruction of public 
passageways" conviction, in Cox v. Louisiana.'"6 In Burden v. 
Rialer (1911), a man was convicted for disturbing another man's 
speech.177 This is an unlikely result in the United States, for 
the First and Fourteenth Amendments only protect the people from 
abridgment of their rights by Congress and stTte legislatures, 
and they say nothing about individuals. Accordingly, this was 
the scene in Gregory, as the demonstrators endured rocks and eggs 
being thrown at them, but it was not an issue in the case.178 
Paoworth v. Coventry (1967) involved a demonstration on Downing 
Street, protesting the Vietnam war. It was held that if they 
obstructed Members of Parliament or created a disturbance by 
Parliament, their actions can be punished.179 This directly
contrasts Edwards and Grace, which overturned convictions for
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picketing near a State House and the Supreme Court building, 
respectively, in Rx..._yt .Cunninghams graham and Burns (1888), a 
group was held guilty of unlawful assembly for holding a meeting 
in Trafalgar Square.1*0 This is much like Clark, for permits 
were needed to demonstrate in a park in the nation*s capitol.181
It appears that the only real difference between the United 
State* and Great Britain is that the latter is not constrained by 
a constitution; the word Constrained11 is used because Britain is 
just as free to give rights as they are to take them away, in 
order to achieve the best balance of liberty and order. However, 
tearing up our constitution is hardly the answer, since our 
heterogeneous society most likely could never come to the kind of 
consensus Britain has. As far as the world in general is con­
cerned, the United States grants more freedom of symbolic expres­
sion than most nations, but is right in line with the western 
industrialized nations.
gfiMCLBaiQH
The government of law has prevailed in protecting individu­
als from abuses of the freedom of symbolic expression by men. 
Despite the Supreme Court's political nature, as shown in the 
Walker and Shuttlesworth sequence,182 its academic nature re- 
suited in reasonable boundaries for freedom of symbolic expres­
sion. The Court generally allowed this, #s long as no absolutely 
compelling governmental interest was involved, such as maintain­
ing security in the jails in Addsriy.183 As a result of this,
it is very common to see symbolic expression throughout the 
nation. For example, I have observed both pro-life and pro­
abortion advocates picketing outside a clinic, every Saturday 
morning for a period of three months; it has been a classic 
confrontation of two opposing views of a major issue in this 
country. Furthermore, they picket on the sidewalk of one side of 
the street; thus, a person can still use a sidewalk to get by, 
and since they do not picket on the streets, the cars are not 
affected at all. Therefore, they have every right to be there. 
However, demonstrations during wartime may be restricted, if 
necessary, as Schenck and Obrien have shown.184 Nevertheless, 
all this is very sensible; as a reasonable person would move to 
the other side of the street to get past the pioketers, he would 
also realize that a real and immediate threat to the nation's 
existence could only be eliminated with the full support of the 
people, even if it means restricting our freedom of symbolic 
expression.
62
63
Notes
Constitution, amend. I.
1 .
2 .
Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576 (1969).
3.
Dorsen, Norman, Paul Bender, and Burt Newborne, Emerson.
Haber, and DorsenlsPolitical And Civil Rights..In. The . United
StaJfcM, p. 1 (note).
4.
Ibid, p. 2.
5.
Berns, Walter, Freedom. Virtue, and The First Amendment, p.
45.
6 .
Hobbes, Thomas, Leviathon. vol. 2 3 of Rrltannlfifii Great 
Books. ed. Nolle Fuller, p. 90.
7.
Chafee, Zachariah Jr., Freedom of Speech and Press, p. 39.
8 .
Bfiglarairlon Qf Independence>
9 •
Hamilton, Alexander, James Madison, and John Jay, The 
ZfidmLLlfit. 2nd ed. New York: Basil Blackwell, 1987.
1 0 .
Ibid, pp. 44-5.
11.
I b i d ,  p .  121.
64
Pollack, Louis H., The Constitution And The Supreme Court 
A Documentary History. Vol I, pp. 129-30.
13.
Poore, Perley, ed., The Federal and State Constitutions. 
Colonial Charters, and other Organic Laws of The United States. 
Part I, p.959.
14.
Warren, Charles, The Making of the Constitution, p. 763.
15.
Pollack, p. 159.
16.
Dorsen, p. 4.
17.
McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 406 (1819).
18.
Dorsen, pp. 4-5.
19.
Gunther, Constitutional Law, p. 978 (note).
20.
Chafee, p. 49.
2 1 .
Gitlow V.  New York, 268 U.S. 65<!, 666 (1925).
2 2 .
Emerson, Thomas I., The System of Freedom of Expression, p.
103.
12.
Massachusetts v. Davis, 162 Mass. 510, 511 (1895).
23 .
65
24.
Gunther, p. 1197.
25.
Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 515-516 (1939).
26.
Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
27.
Ibid, p. 51.
28.
Ibid, p. 52.
29.
Emerson, p• 65.
30.
Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204 (1919); Debs v.
United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919).
31.
Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919).
32.
Ibid, p.
3 3 •
Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 366-368 (1927).
34.
Ibid, pp. 373, 376, 377.
35.
Emerson, p. 325.
36.
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-2 (1942).
Emerson, p. 326.
37 .
38 •
Ibid, p. 324.
39.
Ibid, p. 324.
40.
Gunther, p. 1175.
41.
Gunther, p. 1174.
42.
DeJonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 362-363 (1937).
43.
Ibid, pp. 364-365.
44.
Ibid, pp. 364-365.
45.
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 446 (1969).
46.
Ibid, pp. 444-5.
47.
Ibid, p. 447.
48.
Ibid, p. 448.
49. I b i d ,  p .  449 .
67
50 .
Coates v. Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 611 (1971).
51 •
Ibid, p. 614.
52.
Shapiro, Martin, and Rocco J. Tesolini, American Con 
atitutional Law, p. 343.
53 •
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303-304 (1940).
54.
Ibid, p. 310.
55.
Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 538 (1965).
56.
Ibid, p. 545.
57.
Ibid, p. 551-2.
58.
Ibid, p. 557-8.
59.
Ibid, p. 558.
60.
Ernrson, p. 366.
61.
Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 107 (1973).
62 .
I b i d ,  pp.  108,  109.
68
63.
Near v. Minnesota. 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
64.
COX V .  Louisiana. 379 U.S. 536, 554-555 (1965).
65.
Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 575-576 (1941).
6 6 .
Emerson, p. 371.
67.
Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290, 293 (1951).
68.
Emerson, p. 343.
69.
Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307, 310 (note)
(1967) .
70.
Ibid, p. 314.
71.
Ibid, p. 318.
72
Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 151 (1969).
73.
Emerson, p. 384.
74.
Ledsky, Charles K., "Parade Ordinances And Prior Re­
straints," Ohio State Law Journal, p. 865.
Ibid, p. 858.
75.
76.
Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 238 (1963).
77.
Ibid, p. 237.
78 •
Ibid, p. 235.
79.
Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 563 (1965).
80.
Ibid, pp. 572, 573.
81.
Ibid, p. 584.
82.
United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 172-173 (1983).
83.
Ibid, p. 183.
84.
Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 19 (1971).
85.
Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157, 173-174 (1961).
86.
Taylor v. Louisiana, 370 U.S. 154, 155, 156 (1965).
87.
Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131, 138 (1966).
88.
Ibid, pp. 141-142.
70
89.
Ibid, pp. 149-150.
90.
Ibid, p. 151.
91.
Ibid, p. 159.
92.
Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.s.
93.
Ibid, p. 41.
94.
Ibid, pp. 47-48.
39, 40 (1966).
95.
Police Department of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95, 96
(1972) .
96.
Grayned v. Rockford, 408 U.s. 104, 120-121, 119 (1972).
97.
Clark v. Community For Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 
293 (1984).
98.
Ibid, pp. 296-^99.
99.
Boos v. Barry, (1988) (slip op. at 15, 18, 20).
1 0 0 .
Bachellar v. Maryland, 397 U.S. 564, 571 (1970).
United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 686, 687 (1985).
101.
71
Gregory v. City of Chicago, 394 U.S, 111, 112 (1969).
103.
Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 457 (1980).
104.
Ibid, pp. 460, 461.
105.
Frisby v. Schultz (1988) (slip op., at 2).
106.
Ibid., p. 7.
107.
Ibid., pp. 12-13.
108.
Tinker et al. v. Des Moines Independent Community School 
District fet al., 393 U.S. 503, 505-506 (1969).
109.
Ibid, pp. 506, 508.
1 1 0.
Schacht v. United States, 398 U.S. 58, 59-60 (1970).
111.
Ibid, pp. 62-63.
1 1 2.
Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 16 (1971).
113.
Ibid, pp. 18, 19.
114.
102.
I b i d ,  pp.  1 9 - 2 1 ,  23 .
72
115.
National Socialist Party v. Skokie, 432 U.S. 43, 44
(1977) .
116.
Will, George F., ''Nazis: Outside the Constitution," Points 
of view Readings In American Government And Politics. P- 291.
117.
American Civil Liberties Union, "Why Free Speech For 
Racists and Totalitarians," Points Of View Readings In American 
SQVfirmasnt AndEolltlcs, p. 290.
ns.
Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 361 (1931).
119,
Ibid, pp. 367-368.
1 20 .
Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 368 (1931).
1 2 1 .
Ibid, p. 369.
122.
Emerson, p. 80.
123.
Boos v. Barry, (1988) (slip op. at 1).
124.
Minersville School District v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 595, 
598, 599-600 (1940).
125.
West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 
624, 626 (1943).
73
126.
Ibid, pp. 634, 637, 642.
127.
Ibid, p. 642.
128.
Ibid, pp. 647, 649.
129.
MFlag Desecration As Constitutionally Protected Symbolic 
speech," lam Law..Review, p. 625.
130.
United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 370 (1968).
131.
Ibid, p. 376.
132.
Ibid, pp. 375, 377.
133.
Ibid, pp. 377, 377-378, 378-380.
134.
Ibid, pp. 381-382.
135.
Ibid, pp. 383-384.
136.
Emerson, p. 85.
137.
Alfange, Jr. Dean, "Free Speech And Symbolic Conduct: The 
Draft-Card Burning Case," The Supreme Court Review, pp. 3-4.
138. I b i d ,  p .  10.
74
139.
Ibid, p. 37.
140.
Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 578-579 (1969).
141.
Ibid, p. 578.
142.
Ibid, p. 581.
143.
Ibid, pp. 590-593.
144.
Smith V.  Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 578 (1974).
145.
Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 407 (1974).
146.
Ibid, p. 408.
147.
Ibid, pp. 408-409.
148.
Ibid, p. 415.
149.
Shapiro and Tesolini, American Constitutional Law, p. 350.
150.
Texas v. Johnson, (1989) (slip op. at 1-2).
151. I b i d . ,  p .  2 ( n o t e ) .
75
152.
Ibid, p. 8.
153.
Ibid, p. 9.
154.
Ibid, pp. 12-13.
155.
Ibid, pp. 12-13.
156.
Ibid, p. 15.
157.
Ibid, p. 16.
158.
Ibid, pp. 17-18.
159.
Ibid, p. 19.
160.
Ibid, p. 20.
161.
Ibid,
162.
p. 1.
Texas v. Johnson, (1989) (clip op., Rehnquist's dissent,
at 8).
163.
Ibid, pp. 11-12.
164.
"Flag Burning, HUD Scandle Dominate Press Queries," 
congressional Quarterly, p. 1650.
76
15. Isaacson, Walter, "O'er the Land of The Free," Timef p.
165.
166.
Zinn, Howard, "How Democratic Is America?" Points of vjewBetadlngg in. Amfi.rl s.ftD SoYernment and Rol i t i ss i p. u .
167•
King Jr., Martin Luther, "Why We Can't Wait," 1964.
168.
United Nations, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 
art. 19, 20.
169.
European Convention For the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental.freedoms# art. 10, n.
170.
West Germany's standard of living and labor productivity 
has consistently been one of the best in the world for many years.
171.Bm I el-Lm  of the federal,Republ ic ..of Germany# art. 5,
sect. 1; art. 8, sect. 1 & 2.
172.
Phillips, O. Hood, Constitutional And Administrative Law.
p. 430.
173.
DeJonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937); Brandenburg v. 
Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
174.
Phillips, p. 435.
175.
315 U.S. 568 (1942).
77
176.
379 U.S. 536 (1965).
177,
Phillips, P- 434 .
178,>
394 U.S. 111 (1969).
179,i
Phillips, P- 434 .
180,1
Ibid, pp. 436-437.
181.
181.
Clark v. Community For Creative Nonviolence, 468 U.S. 288
(1984) .
182.
Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307 (1967)?
Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147 (1969).
183 •
'Adderly v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966).
184.
Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919)? United
States v. O ’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
78
Table of Casts
Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919).
Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966).
Bachellar v. Maryland, 397 U.S. 564 (1970).
Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. —  (1988) (slip op.).
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131 (1966).
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1*40).
Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455 (1980).
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
Clark v. Community For Creative Nonviolence, 468 U.S. 288 
(1984) .
Coates v. Cincinati, 402 U.S. 611 (1971).
Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965).
Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941) .
Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919).
DeJonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937).
Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963).
Frisby v. Schultz (1988) (slip op.).
Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204 (1919). 
earner v. Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157 (1961).
Gltlow V. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
Grayned v. Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972).
Gregory v. City of Chicago, 394 U.S. Ill (1969).
Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105 (1973).
Howat v. Kansas, 258 U.S. 181 (1922).
Kunz v. New York, 3,0 U.S. 290 (1951).
Massachusettes v. Davis, 162 Mass. 510 (1895).
McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316 (1819).
Minersville School District v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940). 
National Socialist Party v. Skokie, 432 U.S. 43 (1977).
Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
Police Department of Chicago v. Mosely, 408 U.S, 92 (1972). 
Schacht v. United States, 398 U.S. 58 (1970).
Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147 (1969).
Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566 (1974).
Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405 (1974).
Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576 (1969).
Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931).
Taylor v. Louisiana, 370 U.S. 154 (1965),
Texas v. Johnson (1989) (slip op.).
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, 
393 U.S. 503 (1969).
United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675 (1985).
United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171 (1983).
United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
79
Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307 (1967).
West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 
(1943) .
Whitney v, California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927).
Selected Bibliography
Alfange Jr., Dean, MFree Speech And Symbolic Conduct: The 
Draft-Card Burning Case," The Supreme Court Review 
1968. Philip B. Kurland, ed. , Chicago: The University 
of Chicago Press, 1968.
American Civil Liberties Union, MWhy Free Speech For Racists 
and Totalitarians,H Readings In American Government And 
Politics. 2nd ed., Robert E. DiClerico and Allen S. 
Hammock, ed., Reading, Massachusettes: Addison-Wesley
Publishing Co., 1983.
Basic Law of The Federal Republic of Germany. 194 9 as tfrmixJ
by 1983. Bonn: Press and Infromation Office of the Federal
Government, 1989.
Berns, Walter, Freedom. Virtue and The First Amendment* 
Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1957.
Chafee Jr., Zechariah, Freedom of Speech and Press. New 
York: Carrie Chapman Catt Memorial Fund, Inc., 1955.
Council of Europe, Convention For t he _ Protect Ion of H uma n 
Rights andFundamental Freedoms. 1951.
Dorsen, Norman, Paul Bender, and Burt Newborne, Emerson. 
Hater, and PoisonVs Political And Civil Rights in The 
United States. 4th ed., Vol. I. Boston: Little, Brown 
and Company, 1976.
Emerson, Thomas I., The Systemic!_ Freedom of Expression. 
New York: Random House, Inc., 1970.
"Flag Burning, HUD Scandle Dominate Press Queries," 
Congressional Quarterly 1 9 9 9 • i July 1989, vol. 47, 
No. 46. Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly,
Inc., 1989.
"Flag Desecration As Constitutionally Protected Speech," 
Iowa Law Review, vol. 56. Iowa City: The University fo
Iowa, 1971.
Gillraor, Donald M., and Jerome A. Barron, fcLaaa.CO.imunlS.at.lfin
Law. Cases And Comment. 4th ed. St. Paul, Minnesota:
80
West Publishing Co., 1984.
Gunther, Gerald, Constitutional Law. 11th ed. New York: 
The Foundation Press, Inc., 1985.
Halmiiton, Alexander, James Madison, and John Jay, The
Federalist. 2nd ed. New York: Basil Blackwell, 1987.
Hobbes, Thomas, Leviathan, in Brltannica Great Books, vol. 
23, ed. Fuller, Nelle, Chicago: The University of
Chicago, 1989.
Isaacson, Walter, "O'er the Land of The Free,” Time. 3 July 
1989, 14.
King Jr., Martin Luther, "Why We Can’t Wait,” (1964).
Ledsky, Charles K., "Parade Ordinances And Prior Restraints,H 
Ohio State Law Journal, vol. 30. Columbus, Ohio; The
Ohio state University, 1969.
Phillips, O. Hood, Constitutional And Administrative Law. 
5th ed. London: Sweet and Maxwell, 1973.
Pollack, Louis H., The Constitution And The Supreme Court.
A Documentary History. Vol. 1 & II. Cleveland: The 
World Publishing Company, 1968.
Poore, Perley, ed., The Federal and State Constitutions. 
Colonial Charters, and other Organic Laws of the United 
States. Part I & II. Washington D.C.: Government
Printing Office, 1877.
Shapiro, Martin, Freedom of Speech: The Supreme Court And 
Judicial Review. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: 
Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1966.
Shapiro, Martin, and Rocco J. Tesolini, American
Constitutional Law. 6th ed. New York: Macmillian
Publishing Co., Inc., 1983.
United Nations, Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 1948.
Warren, Charles, The Making of the Constitution. Boston: 
Little, Brown and Company, 1937.
Will, George F., "Nazis: Outside the Constitution," Points fO 
View. Readings In American Government And Politics. 2d ed. 
ed., Robert E. DiClerico and Allen S. Hammock, Reading, 
Massachusettes: Addison-Wesley Publishing Co., 1983.
Zinn, Howard, "How Democratic Is America?" Points of View.
81
Readings In American Government And Politics, 
ed., Robert E. DiClerico and Allen S. Hammock, 
Massachusettes: Addison-Wesley Publishing Co.,
2nd ed. 
Reading, 
1983.
